SUMMARY This paper, for the first time, presents a ÔÖÓÚ¹ ÐÝ × ÙÖ signature scheme with message recovery based on the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm. The proposed scheme is proven to be secure in the strongest sense (i.e., existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks) in the random oracle model under the discrete logarithm assumption. We give a concrete analysis of the security reduction. When practical hash functions are used in place of truly random functions, the proposed scheme is almost as efficient as the elliptic-curve version of the Schnorr signature scheme and existing schemes with message recovery such as the elliptic-curve version of the Nyberg-Rueppel and Miyaji schemes. 
Introduction

Background: Digital Signature Schemes with
Message Recovery
A digital signature scheme with message recovery is useful for many applications in which small messages (e.g., around 100 bits) should be signed. For example, small messages including time, date and identifiers are signed in certified email services and time stamping services. As shown in [14] - [16] , the benefits of message recovery are: direct use in other schemes such as identitybased public-key systems or key agreement protocols and natural combination with ElGamal type encryption (which may produce the so-called sign-encryption).
The existing digital signature schemes with message recovery are classified into two types: RSA based schemes (RSA type) and discrete logarithm based schemes (DL type), where an elliptic curve based signature scheme is a DL type. PSS-R [3] and ISO/IEC 9796-1, 9796-2 are RSA type signature schemes with message recovery, and the Nyberg-Rueppel [14] - [16] , and Miyaji [12] schemes are of DL type.
The security flaws of heuristic schemes such as PKCS#1 (Ver.1) and the above-mentioned RSA-based signatures with message recovery, ISO/IEC 9796-1 and 9796-2, have recently been found [4] , [6] . Therefore, provable security, even in the random oracle model, is most desirable to assure the security of a practical scheme.
Among existing signature schemes with message recovery, only the PSS-R scheme [3] has been shown to be provably secure (existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks) under reasonable assumptions (the RSA assumption and random oracle model). In [12] , Miyaji proposed an elliptic-curve message recovery signature scheme and showed that the scheme was as secure as the elliptic-curve DSA. However, the reduction holds iff the curve is anomalous, which is undesirable since it makes the discrete logarithm problem easy [22] . Accordingly, its security remains unknown if it is implemented over nonanomalous curves. Accordingly, there has been no provably secure signature schemes with message recovery based on the discrete logarithm problem even in the random oracle model.
For small size messages, message recovery signature schemes based on the integer factoring, typified by PSS-R, yield much larger signatures (e.g., 1024 bit signatures for 100 bit messages). On the other hand, schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem, typified by the Nyberg-Rueppel scheme, produce relatively small signatures if they are implemented over a finite group over elliptic-curve (e.g., 320 bit signatures) as one can choose a much smaller public key. Accordingly, the most appropriate signature scheme with message recovery for small messages should be elliptic curve based, but there exists no provably secure elliptic curve based signature scheme with message recovery (even in the random oracle model).
Our Result
This paper elaborates the work in our preliminary paper [1] that solved this problem. That is, we, for the first time, present a provably secure (existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks) DL-type signature schemes with message recovery under two reasonable assumptions; the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm assumption and the random oracle assumption. A concrete analysis of the reduction to prove the security of the proposed signature scheme is given as well.
Recently Canetti et al. [5] demonstrated that it is possible to devise cryptographic protocols which are provably secure in the random oracle model but for which no complexity assumption property instantiates the random oracle modeled hash function. However, the examples they used to make the random oracle model paradigm fail were very contrived, so the concerns induced by these examples do not appear to apply any of the concrete practical schemes that have been proven secure in the random oracle model.
When practical hash functions are used in place of truly random functions, the proposed scheme is almost as efficient as the (elliptic-curve) Schnorr signature scheme and existing schemes with message recovery such as (elliptic-curve) Nyberg-Rueppel and Miyaji schemes.
Though we construct a scheme based on an ellipticcurve system due to the efficiency of signature size for small messages, it can be directly translated to a scheme based on an ordinary multiplicative group. Our proof of security works as well since it does not rely on any unique feature of the elliptic-curve DL.
Proposed Scheme
[Key generation] Each signer S generates elliptic curve parameters, q for a finite field F q ; two elliptic curve coefficients a and b, elements of F q , that define an elliptic curve E; a positive prime integer p dividing the number of points on E; and a curve point G of order p. Here |p| = k, and set (k 1 , k 2 ) such that |q| = k 1 + k 2 . Note that k, k 1 and k 2 are the security parameters and are assumed to be appropriately large. As shown in the sequel, k 2 defines the size of the recoverable message and min(k 1 , k 2 ) defines security in terms of unforgeability. See remark 2 below.
Signer S uniformly selects x ∈ Z/pZ, and calculates a point, Y , on E, where Y = −x·G. The secret key of the signer is x, and its public-key is (F q , E, G, Y ).
The parameters, (F q , E, G), of the elliptic curve domain can be fixed by the system and shared by many signers.
In this paper, we follow the standard notations on the elliptic curve operation: the elliptic curve addition by +, and G+· · ·+G (x times additions) by x·G. (P ) X denotes the X-coordinate of point P on E.
[Signature generation]
To sign message m ∈ {0, 1} * , S generates the signature, (r, z) using public random oracle functions,
where m R is the rightmost k 1 bits of m, m N is the remaining part of m, and ω is a randomly selected element of Z/pZ. ⊕ denotes the bit-wise exclusive-or operation. S sends (r, z) and m N to verifier V .
[Verification] Verifier V recovers the recoverable part m R from (r, z), and checks its validity as follows: 
Remark 2: Typical security parameters for the signature scheme are: k = |p| = 160, |q| = 160, k 1 = k 2 = 80. It follows that the size of the recoverable part of the message, |m R |, is 80 bits.
Remark 3:
The essential part in designing the signature scheme is how to construct the redundancy coding, m , of the recoverable part of the message m. Our coding is based on random functions (oracles), so that m distributes uniformly over the randomness of the random functions, regardless of the distribution of m. This property of input-output independence, is used in the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 4. The property of the uniform distribution of m is used in the proof of Lemma 4 (especially for Case 2).
Security
This section proves that the proposed signature scheme with message recovery is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks in the random oracle model under the (elliptic-curve) discrete logarithm assumption.
Outline of the proof: The proof consists of several reductions. We first show a reduction from forgery of a signature to impersonation in an identification scheme induced from our signature scheme (Sect. 3.5). This reduction itself consists of three reduction stages as we follow the technique called ID-reduction introduced in [17] . We then show a reduction from impersonation to solving the discrete logarithm problem (Sect. 3.6). Finally the total cost of reduction is described in Sect. 3.7. Sections 3.1 to 3.4 provide the definitions necessary for the lemmas, theorems and proofs in Sects. 3.5 to 3.7.
Security Definition of the Signature Scheme
We will start by quantifying the security of a signature scheme: Here we assume that the attacker can dynamically ask the legitimate signer S to sign any message, m, using him as a kind of oracle. This model covers the very general attack for signature situations, called adaptively chosen message attack.
Definition 1:
A probabilistic Turing machine (adversary) A breaks the proposed signature scheme with (t, q sig , q F 1 , q F 2 , q H , ) iff A can forge a signature of a message with success probability greater than . We allow chosen-message attacks in which A can see up to q sig legitimate chosen signatures that follow the signature generating procedure, and allow q F 1 /q F 2 /q H invocations of F 1 /F 2 /H, respectively, within processing time t. The probability is taken over the coin flips of A, F 1 , F 2 , H and signing oracle S.
Definition 2:
The proposed signature scheme is (t,
Intractability Definition of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
Definition 3: A probabilistic Turing machine (adversary) A breaks the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, (F q , E, G, Y ), with (t, ) iff A can find x from (F q , E, G, Y ) with success probability greater than within processing time t, where Y = x·G. The probability is taken over the coin flips of A. Here, F q denotes a finite field with q elements, E denotes an elliptic curve over F q , and G is a point of E with prime order p.
Definition 4:
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, (F q , E, G, Y ), is (t, )-secure if and only if there is no adversary that can break it with (t, ).
Identification Scheme Induced from Our Signature Scheme
Here we introduce the identification scheme that is induced from the above-mentioned signature scheme. This identification scheme is useful in analyzing the concrete security of our signature scheme, since using the ID Reduction Technique in [17] together with this induced identification scheme is very effective to analyze the security.
In the identification scheme, prover P publishes a public key while hiding the corresponding secret key, and proves his identity (knowledge of the secret key) to verifier V . Here, functions F 1 and F 2 are shared by P and V .
(Identification Scheme)
[Key generation] Prover P generates a pair of a secret key, x, and a public key, (F q , E, G, Y ), using key generation algorithm G, where Y = −x·G.
[Identification Protocol] P proves his identity, and verifier V checks the validity of P 's proof as follows:
• P selects m R ∈ {0, 1} k 2 and m N ∈ {0, 1} * . P then generates r as follows:
where ω ∈ Z/pZ is uniformly selected. P then sends r and m N to V .
• V selects random challenge c ∈ {0, 1} k and sends it to P .
• P generates answer z as follows:
Remark: Sending m N seems useless in the above scheme as it is not used in verification. However, it does affect to the verifier's selection of c just as the output of hash function H changes with m N .
Security Definition of the Identification Scheme
Definition 5: A probabilistic Turing machine (adversary) A breaks an identification scheme with (t, q F 1 , q F 2 , ) iff A as a prover can cheat honest verifier V with a success probability greater than within processing time t. A is allowed to make q F 1 (and q F 2 ) invocations of F 1 (and F 2 ). Here, the probability is taken over the coin flips of A, F 1 , F 2 and V .
Definition 6:
An identification scheme is (t, q F 1 , q F 2 , )-secure iff there is no adversary that can break it with (t, q F 1 , q F 2 , ).
ID Reduction Lemmas of the Proposed Signature Scheme
We derive Lemma 1 following the ID Reduction Technique. Our lemma gives a slightly more precise cost of reduction than [17] . the query is included in the conversation with S up to this point, or 3. define H with a random value taken from Θ 2 and return the value.
Step-3 Output what A 1 outputs if -it contains the i-th query to H, and -it is not contained in the conversations with simulated S.
Abort, otherwise.
Let (r, z) be the output of A 2 . To estimate the success probability of A 2 , we first argue the following claims.
Claim 1:
A 2 is successful in simulating S with probability greater than 1 −
Observe that A 2 is successful in simulating S unless a random entry of H has been already defined. This happens when A 1 asks H about a value before it is given from S, and its probability is at most q H 2 k . All in all, the simulation is successful with probability of at least k . The success probability of A 2 , which is , is estimated as follows:
The running time of A 2 increases from that of A 1 due to the simulation time needed to generate q sig signatures.
This part of the reduction is rather simple and actually the same as that of [17] .
Step-1 Run A 2 . If it asks to F 1 or F 2 , behave transparently. If it asks to H, with r, send the query to the verifier.
Step-2 Get a challenge, say c, from the verifier.
Step-3 Input c to A 3 as a response from H.
Step-4 Output what A 2 outputs.
A 3 is clearly successful in its impersonation iff A 2 is successful in forging a signature. The running time is not increased from that of A 2 except for branching.
To analyze our scheme, the following additional lemma is required, since the induced identification scheme additionally uses random oracles F 1 and F 2 .
Lemma 2: (Additional Reduction Lemma)
If A 3 breaks the identification scheme with (t , q F 1 , q F 2 , ), there exists A 4 which breaks the identification scheme with (t , 1, 1, ) , where =
Proof Let Q i be the i-th query from A 3 to random oracle F 1 and ρ i be the i-th answer from F 1 to A 3 . Let R j = ρ i (where ρ i is consistent with Q i ) be the query from A 3 to random oracle F 2 . Given a public key for the identification scheme, random oracles F 1 , F 2 , a verifier V , and random tape Θ 4 , construct A 4 as follows:
Step-1 Select integer i from {1, . . . , q F 1 } randomly.
Step-2 Run A 3 simulating its environment as follows: 
k 1 ) where m = r ⊕ (z·G + c·Y ) X , are satisfied, V will accept. If A 4 can lead V to accept, there are two cases: 1) m R was asked to random oracle F 1 and [m ] k 1 was asked to random oracle F 2 , 2) otherwise. In the latter case, the success probability of A 4 is at most max{1/2 k 1 , 1/2 k 2 }, because of the randomness of the random oracle. Thus, the success probability of
The running time of A 4 is not increased from that of A 3 .
Security of the Induced Identification Scheme
A Boolean matrix and heavy row will be introduced in order to analyze the security of the above-mentioned identification scheme induced from the proposed signature scheme. Assume that there is a cheater A 4 who can break the above-mentioned identification scheme with (t , 1, 1, ) .
Here there are two cases: (Case 1) A 4 's query to F 1 is made before sending r, and (Case 2) A 4 's query to F 1 is made after sending r. Let 1 and 2 be A 4 's success probability in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively. Here 1 + 2 = holds. Consider the execution of (A 4 , V ) where A 4 is given random tape RA and oracles F 1 , F 2 and V is given random tape RV . Define (A 4 , V ) = 1 if V accepts with Case 2. Define (A 4 , V ) = 0, otherwise. Formally, we define such a system with boolean matrix H as follows. Matrix of (A 4 , V ) ) Boolean matrix H is a matrix such that 1. rows correspond to all possible choices of (RA, 
Definition 7: (Boolean
Definition 8: (Heavy Row)
A row of matrix of H is heavy if the fraction of 1's along the row is at least 1 /2, where the success probability of A 4 with Case 1 is at least 1 .
We will use the following useful and well-known lemma introduced in [9] .
Lemma 3: (Heavy Row
Lemma) The 1's in H are located in heavy rows of H with a probability of at least 1, 1, ) , there exists A 5 which breaks the the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem with (t * , * ) where
Here Φ 1 is the verification time of the identification protocol, Φ 3 is the calculation time of x in the final stage of the reduction, and e is the base of the natural logarithm. Proof Assume that there is a cheater A 4 who can break an identification with (t , 1, 1, ). We will construct a machine A 5 which breaks the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, (F q , E, G, Y ), with (t * , * ) using A 4 . First, we assume that 1 ≥ /2, where either case occurs, 1 ≥ /2 or 2 > /2, since 1 + 2 = .
(Later we consider the case when 2 > /2.)
We will discuss the following probing strategy of H to find two 1's along the same row in H [9]:
1. Probe random entries in H to find an entry a (0) with 1. Let c (0) be V 's challenge message corresponding to a (0) . We denote the row where
2. After a (0) is found, probe random entries along H (0) to find another entry with 1. We denote it by a (1) and c (1) is V 's challenge message corresponding to a (1) . If c (1) ≡ −c (0) (mod p), then discard it and find another entry with 1.
is an entry with 1, where
where c (0) = c (1) . That is,
Hence if this strategy is successful, x of Y = x·G can be computed by
since p is a prime and c
(mod p). We will now show that this strategy is successful with constant probability in just O(1/ 1 ) probes, using Lemma 3 concerning the useful concept, heavy row, defined in Definition 8.
Let p 1 be the success probability of step 1 with
, because the fraction of 1's in H is at least 1 . Let p 2 be the success probability of step 2 with
10 , because the probability that H (0) is heavy is at least . Let * 1 be the success probability of the abovementioned procedure and t * 1 be the running time for procedure. It follows that *
Next, we consider the case when 2 > /2, i.e., A 4 's success probability in Case 2 (A 4 's query to F 1 is made after sending r) is greater than /2.
Execute random trials of ((RA, F 1 , F 2 ), c) to find a value of ((RA, F 1 , F 2 ), c) with which A 4 succeeds with Case 2. Here, in each trial, the replies of F 1 and F 2 are set as follows: F 1 's reply: [m ] k 1 , and F 2 's reply: [m ] k 2 , where m = (δ·G) X ⊕r and δ is uniformly selected from Z/pZ. Here note that although the distribution of m is not guaranteed to be uniform (since (δ·G) X is not uniform), A 4 succeeds in Case 2 only when the values of m follow the distribution of (δ·G) X ⊕ r. Therefore, the success probability of A 4 in Case 2 under the above-mentioned strategy of F 1 and F 2 at least equals that under the uniform distribution of F 1 and F 2 (i.e., greater than /2).
If a value of ((RA, F 1 , F 2 ), c) with which A 4 succeeds in Case 2 is found, x with Y = x·G can be computed by
Let * 2 be the success probability of the abovementioned procedure and t * 2 be its running time. *
Since the first step in the probing stage in Case 1 and the probing stage in Case 2 can be merged to a unified probing stage, we can obtain the total success probability and running time as follows: 
Security of the Proposed Signature Scheme
The previous sections proved that breaking the proposed signature scheme implies breaking the induced identification scheme (Lemma 1), and breaking the identification scheme implies solving the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem (Lemma 2, 4). In conclusion, we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 1: (Security of the proposed signature scheme) Let ≥ ( 
Remarks on Variants
One can put the non-recoverable part of a message into the redundancy instead of putting into H. That is, signer S computes m and c as The security of this variant can be proven in a similar way to that of the original scheme with some slight adaptation. Indeed, reduction cost is unchanged.
The above redundancy coding can be used when one uses RSA as a trapdoor function. For RSA public key (e, N ), private key d, and hash functions N ) holds or not. This variant can be regarded as a variant of PSS-R that has no random-bit padding [3] . Its security can be discussed in a similar way to that of FDH-RSA in [2] , [3] noticing that F 1 and F 2 are not invoked in a consistent way.
By using the proposed redundancy coding, one can also construct provably secure signature schemes with message recovery based on some variants of the ElGamal signature scheme [18] whose security can be proven in the random oracle model.
Conclusion
This paper presented a provably secure signature scheme with message recovery based on the (ellipticcurve) discrete logarithm. The proposed scheme was shown to be secure in the strongest sense (i.e., existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks) in the random oracle model under the (ellipticcurve) discrete logarithm assumption. We provided a concrete analysis of the security reduction. When practical hash functions are used in place of truly random functions, the proposed scheme is almost as efficient as the (elliptic-curve) Schnorr signature scheme and existing schemes with message recovery such as (ellipticcurve) Nyberg-Rueppel and Miyaji schemes (because the additional computation of our scheme over that needed with the Schnorr signature scheme is just the function evaluation of F 1 and F 2 , and data comparison).
